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religion is enlarged. 34 It is submitted that a definitive determination
of the status of parental religious objections should be written into
the Children's Court Act.35 It may be noted finally that the indoctrination of a child for the purpose of securing his consent to surgery,
here ordered to forestall adverse psychological consequences, 36 is a
novelty in the reported cases.

DOMESTIC RELATIONSPARENT HAVING CUSTODY PERMITTED
TO REMOVE CHILDREN FROM STATE.-Respondent-mother, who had

obtained custody of her two infant children in a habeas corpus proceeding, intended to remarry and remove with them to another state.
She petitioned the Court to modify the custody order so as to permit
such removal. Appellant-father cross-motioned for the children's
custody and to restrain the mother from removing them. The Court
of Appeals, without opinion, affirmed a determination of the Supreme
Court 1 which held that, under the circumstances presented, the
mother's petition should be granted, with provisos. 2 Freed v. Freed,
309 N.Y. 668, 128 N.E.2d 319 (1955).
The jurisdiction of a state to determine the custody of infants
within its territory has its origin in the protection that is due the incompetent or helpless. 3 In England, it was first absorbed by chancery
through the delegation by the crown of its prerogative, as parens
patrie, to care for infants. 4 In the United States, though an original
bill in equity may still be brought, 5 statutes have been enacted which
34 Religious considerations are more likely to arise in regulating children's
conduct than in making a choice of remedy for their physical ills. The methods
and recommendations of an individual psychiatrist diagnosing or treating a conduct problem might very well conflict with religious precepts or prohibitions.
35A provision based upon conflict with religion (cf. N.Y. EDuc. LAW
§ 3204), and saving the requirements of law as to the control of communicable
disease, would seem preferable to a narrower exemption predicated upon preference for religious healing (cf. N.Y. PUB. HEA.TH LAW § 2583).
36 Under the interim order, the boy and his father were shown the results
obtained in various cases through the treatment proposed and the method of
treatment was explained in detail. While they professed themselves impressed,
their opposition was not diminished.
I Matter of Freed, 133 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd iner., 284 App. Div.
892, 134 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1954).
2 The Court provided for a substantial enlargement of the father's custody
and visitation rights.
3Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (dictum);
See JACOBS AND GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 943 (3d ed. 1952).
4 See JACOBS AND GOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 943.

5 Finlay v. Finlay, supra note 3 at 433, 148 N.E. at 626 (dictum).
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permit the determination of custody by habeas corpus proceedings,16
or as an incident to actions for annulment, separation or divorce.
Where the custody order is incidental to a divorce action, jurisdiction
is usually determined by the domicile of the parents.8 However, the
residence of the child suffices in a habeas corpus proceeding or where
an original bill is brought in equity.9
In addition to the making of initial awards, equity may decree
a modification of the original custody order. Thus, visitation rights
may be altered, 10 custody transferred," or removal to another jurisdiction permitted. 12 But whether a motion to modify will be enter-"
tained depends upon a finding of changed circumstances since the
previous order; 13 for, if the condition of the parties has not appreciably altered, the prior award is res judicata in any subsequent proceeding. 14 However, it lies within the sound discretion of the court
to determine whether or not there are such changed circumstances.15
Generally, remarriage by either parent does not of itself constitute
changed circumstances sufficient to reopen the question of custody. 16
Where permission is sought to take a child to another jurisdiction, different views have been taken as to the effect of such removal
upon visitation rights and future orders of the court. The objections
to removal in various jurisdictions are based on the unenforceability
6

E.g., N.Y. Dom. Ryx.

LAw

§ 70;

KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 60-2223

(1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 9:2-7 (Supp. 1954).
7 See 2 VmuNaRn, AmEICAN FAMILY LAws §§ 95, 131, 142 (1932).
See
also N.Y. Crv. PRAC. Acr §§ 1140, 1170, 1170-a.
8 See 2 VmNrER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 82. However, Section 1147 of the

New York Civil Practice Act also provides for jurisdiction on grounds other
than domicile.

9 See, e.g., Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 At. 1 (1936) (habeas
corpus) ; Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W.2d 165 (1938) (bill in
equity); see Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
10 See, e.g., Karron v. Karron, 239 App. Div. 180, 267 N.Y. Supp. 340 (1st
Dep't 1933) (per curiam); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 346 Ill. App. 436, 105 N.E.2d
117 (1952).
"zSee, e.g., Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. 1 (1910); Futch v.
Futch,
299 S.W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
1
2See, e.g., Darnell v. Smith, 211 Ark. 738, 202 S.W.2d 362 (1947) ; Schmidt
v. Schmidt, supra note 10.
13 See Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 256 App. Div. 1032, 10 N.Y.S.2d 699 (4th
Dep't 1939) (per curiam) ; People ex rel. Michael v. Michael, 188 Misc. 901,
69 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
34 Cormack v. Marshall, 211 Ill. 519, 71 N.E. 1077 (1904) ; Willis v. Willis,
165 Ind. 332, 75 N.E. 655 (1905) ; Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 Atl. 1
(1936).
3. Young v. Young, 209 Ga. 711, 75 S.E.2d 433 (1953) ; Trickey v. Trickey,
158 Ohio St. 9, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952).
"ISee, e.g., Ansorge v. Armour, 267 N.Y. 492, 196 N.E. 546 (1935) ; Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, supra note 13; Davis v. Davis, 78 Ariz. 174, 277 P.2d 261
(1954) ; Self v. Self, 222 Ark. 82, 257 S.W.2d 281 (1953) ; Fennell v. Fennell,
209 Ga. 815, 76 S.E.2d 387 (1953) ; Freese v. Freese, 237 Iowa 451, 22 N.W.2d
242 (1946) ; Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093 (1953).
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of future orders 17 and the impairment of visitation rights.,, The
furnishing of a bond is sometimes required either to secure against
19
or to insure return where temremoval by the parent in custody,
20
porary removal is permitted.
On the other hand, the position has been taken that jurisdiction
is not lost by permitting the child's removal from the state.2 ' The
exponents of this view point out that statutes provide for continuing
jurisdiction in the court,22 and that the full faith and credit clause
23
requires that custody decrees be given effect in the several states.
24
New York courts do not consider jurisdiction lost by removal, although they have recognized that effective control of the child is preHowvented by rendering future orders difficult of enforcement.2
ever, in all jurisdictions the interests and welfare of the child are given
paramount consideration in custody proceedings, and they prevail over
the rights of parents. 26 Thus, in Schmidt v. Schmidt,27 an Illinois
case directly in point with the instant case, removal was permitted
on the ground that the child would thereby be afforded a good home
with the love and affection of his natural mother.
In New York, the right to remove domiciliary children has been
denied in most instances.28 The principal ground for such denial is
17 See Miller v. Miller, 137 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nse., 284 App.
Div. 889, 135 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't 1954); Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873

/

(Mo. App. 1932).
18 See Miller v. Miller, supra note 17; Palma v. Palma, 126 N.Y.L.J. 1531,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1951); Whittemore v. Whittemore, 202 Misc. 175,
109 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
'9 See, e.g., Matter of Pinell's Guardianship, 52 Cal. App. 177, 198 Pac. 215
(1921); Clegg v. Clegg, 186 N.C. 28, 118 S.E. 824 (1923).
2o See, e.g., Roley v. Reeves, 256 Ala. 82, 53 So.2d 366 (1951); Good v.
Good, 205 Ga. 112, 52 S.E.2d 610 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Moore v.
Moore, 172 Pa. Super. 255, 94 A.2d 93 (1953).
accord,
21 See, e.g., Stetson v. Stetson, 80 Me. 483, 15 Ad. 60 (1888);
Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. 1 (1910); Matter of Krauthoff, 191
Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112 (1915); Edwards v. Edwards, 8 N.J. Super.
547, 73 A.2d 759 (Ch. 1950).
22 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1170, Grenier v. Grenier, 175 Misc. 406,
23 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd merz., 261 App. Div. 1043, 27 N.Y.S.2d
449 (4th Dep't 1941) ; MAss. LAWs ANN. c. 208, § 20 (1955).
23 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the . . . Judicial Proceedings of every other State." See Stetson v.
Stetson, sapra note 21.
24 See Freund v. Burns, 268 App. Div. 989, 51 N.Y.S.2d 642 (2d Dep't
1944) ; Grenier v. Grenier, Sepra note 22.
25 See Matter of Meyer, 209 N.Y. 59, 102 N.E. 606 (1913); Miller v. Miller,
137 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd niem., 284 App. Div. 889, 135 N.Y.S.2d
612 (1st Dep't 1954).
26 See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, 21 Ala. 403, 122 So. 615 (1929); Wilson v.
Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 Pac. 21 (1910); Witt v. Burford, 84 Fla. 201,
93 So. 186 (1922) ; Pierce v. Jeffries, 103 W. Va. 410, 137 S.E. 651 (1927).
27 346 Ill. App. 436, 105 N.E.2d 117 (1952).
28 See Miller v. Miller, supra note 25; Bulloch v. Zam, 134 N.Y.S.2d 232
(Sup. Ct. 1954); Palma v. Palma, 126 N.Y.L.J. 1531, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6,
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that removal to any great distance would render illusory the visitation
rights of the residing parent. 29 Thus in Whittenwre v. Whittemore,"0
where a Florida resident petitioned a New York court for the custody
of her children and permission to remove them to her home, the court
denied her custody on the ground that no exceptional reasons were
presented which would warrant the impairment of the father's visitation rights. But the rule which denies the right of removal does not
appear to be absolute; 3 1 for where the residing parent is an unfit
person, the courts will not deny custody to the parent who intends
to remove.3 2 Divergence from the settled rule is further evidenced
4
The principle evolved
in Nash v. Nash3 3 and Karron v. Karron.U
from these cases is that where special circumstances exist, bearing on
the question of the best interests of the child, removal will be permitted. In the Nash case temporary removal to California was permitted where it appeared that the health of the child necessitated the
change in residence. In the Karron case, the petitioner had removed
with her child to her parents' home outside the state because she had
no other means of support. The court, acquiescing in this removal,
granted a petition to modify the father's visitation rights.
Thus, the general rule in New York appears to be that a permanent removal of a domiciliary child will not be permitted where
it will render rights of visitation illusory.35 However, where special
circumstances exist, bearing on the question of the child's best interests, permission will be granted. Previous application of this exception has been made where the health 3 6 of the child was involved. The
instant case represents an additional application of the exception to
the general rule. It is not clear from the opinion what circumstances
led the Court to grant the wife's petition. If based solely on her
intended marriage to a non-resident, the decision seems unjustified
because it is difficult to see how this fact alone bears on the question
1951); Whittemore v. Whittemore, 202 Misc. 175, 109 N.Y.S2d 216 (Sup.
Ct. 1951); Thompson v. Thompson, 60 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
29 Ibid.

A0 Supra note 28.
31 See Palma v. Palma, supra note 28; Whittemore v. Whittemore, supra
note 28.
32 See People ex rel. Muller v. Muller, 124 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1953);
Palma v. Palma, supra note 28 at 1531, col. 4 (dictum).
33236 App. Div. 89, 258 N.Y. Supp. 313 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd mer., 261
N.Y. 579, 185 N.E. 746 (1933).
34239 App. Div. 180, 267 N.Y. Supp. 340 (1st Dep't 1933) (per curiam).
35 Miller v. Miller, 137 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (Sup. Ct.) (dictum), aff'd nen.,
284 App. Div. 889, 135 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't 1954); see Bulloch v. Zam,
134 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Palma v. Palma, 126 N.Y.L.J. 1531,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1951); Whittemore v. Whittemore, 202 Misc. 175,
109 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Strnad v. Strnad, 194 Misc. 743, 83 N.Y.S.2d
391 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 60 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
36 Nash v. Nash, 236 App. Div. 89, 258 N.Y. Supp. 313 (1st Dep't 1932),
aff'd mere., 261 N.Y. 579, 185 N.E. 746 (1933).
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of the best interests of the child. However, in all probability, the
Court based its decision on the fact that the mother's intended remarriage would afford her a greater opportunity to provide her children
with motherly care.3 ' This was the reasoning which the court
adopted in the Schmidt 38 case under similar circumstances. If this
was the rationale of the Court, then, though the decision may work
a hardship on the father, nevertheless, it is consonant with the principle that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration in custody
litigation. However, the Court did not indicate whether or not it considered that the child's welfare may be affected by moral implications
of the mother's intended remarriage. Certainly, in any case where
the parent having custody intends to remarry, the courts cannot ignore
their duty to weigh these considerations against such advantages as
may seem to accrue to a child from the proposed remarriage.

A
EMINENT DOMAIN -

LIMITATIONS

ON COMPENSATION

FOR A

United States condemned 15.7 acres of
appellants' 82 acre farm as part of the site for an air base. The
District Court awarded damages for the taking and severance. Appellants sought additional compensation for the diminution in value of
their remaining land caused by the particular use to which the land
taken was put. The Court of Appeals held that there could be no
additional recovery, since the land taken was only on the periphery
of the air base and was put to no specific use.1 Boyd v. United States,
222 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955).
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take private
3
2
property for public use without the owner's consent. An entire tract,
PARTIAL TAKING.-The

37 Respondent-mother pointed out in her petition to the Court that her
intended remarriage permitted her to resign her position (which she held to
support herself and the children), thereby making it possible to devote all her
time to the children. Transcript of Record, p. 22, Freed v. Freed, 309 N.Y.
668, 128 N.E.2d 319 (1955).
ss 346 Ill. App. 436, 105 N.E.2d 117 (1952).
1 For purposes of brevity the phrase "specific use" will be used in this
article to denote the rule ".

.

. which limits recovery to the damages resulting

from the construction and operation of such part of the public works as has

been erected on the land taken from the particular owner." 1 ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 56 (2d ed. 1953). See United States

v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911).

2 See 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1950).

3 See Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903); Iriarte v. United
States, 157 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1946); United States v. 25.936 Acres Of Land,
153 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1946).

